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ABSTRACT
Solidity is an object-oriented and high-level language for writing
smart contracts which are used to execute, verify and enforce cred-
ible transactions on permissionless blockchains. In the last few
years, analysis of vulnerabilities in smart contracts has raised con-
siderable interest and numerous techniques have been proposed.
Current techniques lack traceability in source code and have widely
differing work flows. There is no single unifying framework for
analysis, instrumentation, optimisation and code generation of So-
lidity contracts.
In this paper, we present SIF, a comprehensive framework for
Solidity contract monitoring, instrumenting, and code generation.
SIF provides support for Solidity contract developers and testers
to build source level techniques for analysis, bug detection, cov-
erage measurement, optimisations and code generation. We show
feasibility and applicability of the framework using 51 real smart
contracts deployed on the Ethereum network.
KEYWORDS
high level languages, software testing, program instrumentation,
dynamic program analysis, testing tools
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains are the underlying technology for making online se-
cure transactions using cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins and Ethers.
Facilitating, verifying and enforcing negotiations and credible trans-
actions on blockchains is done by smart contracts which are written
into lines of code by the buyer and seller using Turing-complete
languages[5]. Solidity is a popular object-oriented and high-level
language for implementing smart contracts[6, 14] which can be
compiled to byte code for execution on the blockchain network.
With the increased use of smart contracts across application do-
mains, there is a crucial need for analysis and testing techniques
that provide strong security guarantees.
1.1 Problem
Existing work on analysing Solidity contracts for security vulner-
abilities is primarily based on analysing the byte code of smart
contracts, or translating Solidity code to other languages or in-
termediate forms over which analysis is performed. These tech-
niques, although effective in detecting certain vulnerability types,
suffer from lack of traceability back to source code. Oyente [9], for
instance, analyses the byte code from the Solidity compiler and
successfully reports the presence of vulnerabilities. However, it
lacks the ability to trace and localise the bug in the Solidity code.
Zeus [7] translates smart contracts to LLVM bitcode but does not
support complete Solidity syntax, including throw statements ,
self-destructs, virtual functions and assembly code blocks.
Traditional programming languages are all supported by a com-
prehensive framework for code instrumentation, monitoring, opti-
misation and code generation such as LLVM/Clang [8] for C/C++.
This framework support is lacking for smart contracts. Such a
framework would allow easy-to-use instrumentation and monitor-
ing passes for contract code, support for code analysis and checking
different types of vulnerabilities, code coverage measurement, code
optimisations, and finally code generation.
1.2 Goal
Our aim is to provide Solidity developers and testers a framework,
similar to the widely-used C/C++ instrumentation technique Clang
LibTooling [3], to conveniently and effectively instrument and anal-
yse Solidity code.
In order to achieve this goal, we design and implement SIF (So-
lidity Instrumentation Framework) as illustrated in Figure 1 which
has the following capabilities:
(1) Provide an interface for users to query the AST of Solidity
code. For instance, the user can count the number of loops
with a specific condition in the code.
(2) Allow users to insert, modify and delete nodes in the AST.
One example use case is to generate mutations of Solidity
contracts.
(3) Generate Solidity code from the AST which reflects modifi-
cations made by the user.
Benefits. SIF targets Solidity contract developers and testers. The
framework aims to provide a compiler infrastructure formonitoring,
instrumenting, analysing, optimising and generating Solidity code.
Users of SIF wil be able to easily build their own code analysis
tools, working from the AST with existing support for querying,
instrumentation and code generation.
Evaluation. We evaluate our framework by conducting two types
of code instrumentations on smart contracts: inserting property
check assertions and mutation testing by seeding faults. We run
these two instrumentations on a collection of 51 real smart contracts
which are deployed and running on the Ethereum network. Our
experiment result shows that SIF is able to automatically traverse
and modify smart contracts based on user instructions.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we describe existing tools for Solidity code analysis
and instrumentation.
Solidity byte code and transformation analysis. Some of the
existing research and techniques on smart contract verification
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
01
65
9v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  5
 M
ay
 20
19
ISSTA 2019, 15âĂŞ19 July, 2019, Beijing, China Chao Peng and Ajitha Rajan
Solidity CompilerSolidity Contract
Abstract 
Syntax 
Tree
Instrumented
Solidity Contract
☑
☑
☑
User-defined
Instrumentation
SIF
AST Query
AST Modification
Code Generation
Information 
from the AST
Info
</>
Figure 1: SIF work flow
perform byte code analysis to check for potential vulnerabilities [9–
11, 14]. Byte code is the compiled hexadecimal format of smart
contracts. Each unit of the byte code consists of the instruction
representing a certain operation and if any, its operand. Although
Smart contract verification on byte code level is sufficient to check
for the presence of certain types of vulnerabilities, it is hard to
trace the problem back to the Solidity source code level and aid
the developer to fix it. Some other work translates the Solidity
code to the F* languages or represents the code in intermediate
forms including LLVM IR (Intermediate Representation) and XML
format and performs code analysis on the intermediate form [4,
7, 13]. However, code conversion causes the loss of some code
structures and features of Solidity and also suffers from the problem
of mapping the detected vulnerabilities to the original source code.
Solidity code generation and decompilation. To the best of
our knowledge, we are only aware of one tool, Soltar [1], that sup-
ports the translation of the AST back to the source code. However,
Soltar is not maintained and does not support Solidity versions 0.4.3
onwards. Zeus [7] is able to translate Solidity code to LLVM bitcode
but it does not support the complete syntax of Solidity. It is also
worth noting that Zeus does not provide an interface for instrumen-
tation and translation of intermediate form back to Solidity code.
Porosity [2] and another Ethereum smart contract decompiler [12]
are able to decompile the byte code back to the source code but they
are not feasible for users who want to instrument smart contracts
on the source level.
In the next section, We present a generic framework written in
C++ for instrumenting the AST of Solidity code and translating the
AST back to the native source code, supporting the entire Solidity
syntax.
3 SIF OVERVIEW
SIF takes the AST of Solidity code produced by the Solidity compiler
as input, accepts user instructions on AST queries andmodifications
to gather information and make changes to the AST, and generates
Solidity code from the modified AST.
In this section, we describe details about our implementation
of SIF which is available at https://github.com/chao-peng/SIF, and
how its components fit together. We then present a brief user guide
of SIF.
Struct
Root
Field 1 Field 2 Field N...
Figure 2: An AST example highlighting a struct definition
3.1 SIF Implementation
We implement our framework in C++. Key aspects of implementa-
tion are described as follows.
AST representation in C++ classes. The Solidity compiler gen-
erates the AST from the Solidity code in two formats: plain text
with indentations to illustrate trees and JSON (JavaScript Object
Notation) which is a structured data format. In an attempt to make
our tool for Solidity code instrumentation generic and easy to use,
we use C++ classes as our intermediate AST representation. We
implement classes to represent different AST nodes, containing
information captured from the AST in their data fields and pro-
viding methods to access and modify the data. Our tool traverses
the Solidity AST and for each AST node, it instantiates a class of
that node type with all the associated information. The C++ classes
contain methods that allow information about the node to be re-
trieved easily and also modified, if necessary. For instance, a C++
class for an struct definition node has methods for getting and
updating the struct name and maintaining its member fields.
Figure 2 and the following pseudocode listing illustrate how the
AST and the corresponding class are mapped.
class StructDefinitionNode : public ASTNode {
public:
StructDefinitionNode () : ASTNode (); // Constructor
string source_code (); // get source code of the struct
string get_name (); // get the name
void set_name(new_name); // update the name
int num_field (); // get the number of fields
void add_field(new_field); // add a new field
void remove_field(index); // remove a field by index
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void update_field(index , new_field); // update a field
ASTNode get_feild(index); // get a field by its index
private:
string name; // name of the struct
vector <ASTNode > fields; // list of struct fields
};
Code instrumentation. After representing the AST generated by
the Solidity compiler using C++ classes, SIF traverses the AST
starting from the root node in a depth-first fashion. A function
containing instructions of code instrumentation defined by the user
is called when it processes each node as mentioned in Section 3.2.
If the instrumentation instructions have function calls to modify
the node, fields of the corresponding node are changed and stored
accordingly.
Solidity code generation from the AST. For each type of AST
node class, we provide code templates that allow corresponding
Solidity code to be generated. The following pseudocode listing
illustrates the code template for a StructDefinitionNode.
string StructDefinitionNode :: source_code () {
string code = "struct␣" + name + "{";
Iterate a list of element definitions {
code += element_definition.source_code () + ";";
}
code = code + "}";
return code;
}
In the above listing, the template generates Solidity code for a
struct definition by first printing the struct keyword, fol-
lowed by the name of the struct, a left brace indicating the start
of struct element definitions. The template then iterates through
the list of struct element definitions. Once an element definition is
visited, the source code of that definition is appended to the struct
code. When we reach the end of element definitions, a right closing
brace is added, indicating the end of the struct definition.
3.2 Using SIF
SIF provides an interface in the form of a predefined callback func-
tion. The parameter of this function is the AST node that SIF is
currently visiting. This function is defined by the user to query
information from the AST node and make changes to the node by
calling built-in functions provided by SIF. When SIF traverses the
AST of a smart contract, it calls the function every time when it
processes a new node. We illustrate how to use SIF step by step.
Step 1:Write instructions of code instrumentation.We provide
a function named visit and the user can implement the function to
check if the currently visited node has the desired property, such
as if it is an expression statement, or if it is a loop with a certain
condition, and make changes to that node. The framework provides
adequate methods for querying and modifying all types of Solidity
AST nodes.
For example, if the user wants to print out conditions of all for
loops, they need to first determine if the currently visited node
is of the type of for statement. If so, they can call the function
get_condition to get the condition of that for statement. All types
of AST nodes in our framework have a function called source_code()
which returns the source code of themselves. Conditions of loops
are also represented by AST nodes and the function source_code()
can be called. The user can then write statements to print out the
condition to standard output or files.
Step 2: AST generation. SIF relies on the AST generated by the
Solidity compiler. Instead of starting from implementing a source
code parser for Solidity to generate ASTs, we take the existing
functionality provided by the official Solidity compiler, which is
undoubtedly able to parse all language features and code structures.
The user only needs to run the Solidity compiler to produce the
AST of smart contracts and use them as inputs to SIF.
Step 3: Framework execution with user-defined instrumenta-
tion instructions.With the visit function containing instructions
of code instrumentation provided by the user, SIF reads the AST of
the original Solidity code and traverses it. Source code reflecting
changes defined by the user is generated in this last stage.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we show that SIF is able to effectively instrument
smart contracts of different sizes and generate instrumented code
for two common use cases: property check and fault seeding. Both
of them rely on querying and modifying the AST and are able to
cover all capabilities of the framework.
4.1 Experiment Setup
We collect from the Ethereum network 51 unique smart contracts
with the number of lines of code ranging from 27 to 1293. Our
dataset is available at https://github.com/chao-peng/SIF.
We select 5 types of vulnerabilities that can be injected to smart
contracts by instrumenting the code to evaluate the fault seeding
part, as presented in Table 1. For the evaluation of property check,
we utilise both AST query and modification capabilities provided by
SIF. The first 3 types of arithmetic faults can be caught by inserting
assertion statements. Timestamp usage as well as transaction origin
vulnerabilities have specific keywords in the AST and can be de-
tected by querying the AST at syntax level. Details on the design of
code instrumentation for these two use cases are discussed below.
4.2 Code Instrumentation of Use Cases
Property check. When a node is visited and passed to property
check, it first determines whether the node type is susceptible to
any of the vulnerabilities. For arithmetic vulnerabilities including
division by zero, integer overflow and underflow, it makes queries
to the AST and gather information of the node including its type,
operator used and operands. For example, an expression node with
arithmetic operations may be prone to an overflow/underflow error.
In this case, SIF generates relevant assert statements on the result
of the operations in the node that flags a vulnerability when the
assert statement fails. The assert statement as an extra AST node is
added after the node under analysis in the program control flow. For
division by zero vulnerability, SIF inserts a pre condition, before the
node under analysis with a division operator, that asserts the divisor
expression is greater than zero. The detection of timestamp usage
and transaction origin does not require modifications to the AST.
We only ask SIF to check if the AST node has specific keywords
which indicates timestamps and transaction origins are referenced
by the source code.
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Type of vulnerability Type of property assertion Seeded Fault
Division by zero Pre condition Statement with division by zero is inserted.
Overflow Post condition Arithmetic operation resulting in overflow is inserted.
Underflow Post condition Arithmetic operation resulting in underflow is inserted.
Timestamp usage AST Analysis An expression using block timestamp is used in an assignment.
Transaction origin AST Analysis A code block containing a check using the value of tx.origin is inserted.
Table 1: Vulnerability types
Fault Seeding. For each type of vulnerability illustrated in Table 1,
the instruction set creates a new code block containing that vul-
nerability and represent it using an AST node. In each run, SIF
traverses the AST of a Solidity contract and inserts an extra AST
node which is harmless to the original functionality and contains
one type of vulnerability to the original AST. Solidity code is then
generated from the modified AST, referred to as a mutated contract.
We run SIF 5 times with the instruction set to produce all 5 types
of vulnerabilities.
4.3 Experiment Result
We assess feasibility and effectiveness of the framework for AST
traversing and instrumentation using the following criteria, (1)
Solidity language support, (2) Performance of code instrumentation
and (3) Extent of automation. We discuss each of these criteria
below.
4.3.1 Solidity language support. The 51 smart contracts in our
dataset contains a wide variety of solidity constructs. We manually
checked against the Solidity documentation as well as the source
code of the official Solidity compiler, and confirmed that our dataset
covers all syntax of Solidity. Our technique was able to analyse
the AST and generate instrumented code for all 51 smart contracts
automatically. As mentioned in Section 2, the F* tool [4] does not
support loop structures in Solidity. Three contracts in our dataset
contain loops. In addition, self-destructs (appear in 2 subject pro-
grams), throw statements (appear in 10) and inline-assembly blocks
(appear in 3) are not supported by the Zues analysis tool [7]. SIF
fully supports the use of these constructs in Solidity contracts.
4.3.2 Performance of code instrumentation. SIF is proven to be able
to query and modify the AST according to the instructions provided
by the user and generate Solidity code from the modified AST. For
all 51 smart contracts, SIF is able to automatically insert assertions
to the original contracts and if the input causes applicable arithmetic
exceptions, the assertions are able to report them. The vulnerability
seeding tool allowed fully automatic insertion of different types
of vulnerabilities in all 51 smart contracts. The mutated Solidity
contracts were fully compatible with the Solidity compiler and the
execution platform.
4.3.3 Extent of automation. In order to use SIF for AST analysis
and instrumentation purposes, the user only needs to write a set of
instructions of AST queries and modifications by calling functions
provided by SIF to gather information and make changes to the
original code. After the instructions of code instrumentation are
defined by the user, the tool is able to automatically traverse and
instrument the AST with no need of further interactions.
5 CONCLUSION
SIF provides the capability of analysing the AST of Solidity smart
contracts produced by the Solidity compiler and generating Solidity
code back. The user does not need any Solidity AST knowledge.
The framework is promising for contract analysis requiring code in-
strumentation, coverage measurement, fault seeding, event logging,
etc. The empirical evaluation shows that our framework is capable
of (1) automatically analysing the AST and representing it using
C++ classes, (2) providing an interface for the user to retrieve infor-
mation and make changes to the AST, and (3) generating Solidity
code from the instrumented AST.
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